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”A Possible Solution to the Problem Presented
by Missing Owners of Fee Simple Title or Non-Consenting
Owners with a Coal or Lignite Prospect”
The size of our estimated recoverable reserves1 and the
present potential for development portend that the oft predicted accelerated expansion of coal production,

2

compelled

by the gravity of the energy crisis, is now inevitable.

Coal

conversion, i.e., the switch by electric utilities or other
major fuel burning installations from oil or natural gas to
coal as a primary fuel source, as mandated by the Powerplant and
Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978,3 will provide the primary impetus that will make the opening of new mines a likely prospect.

4

The prospective development of coal reserves entails the problems
inherent in acquiring the rights necessary to conduct mining
operations.

Difficulties in determining the mineral ownership,

locating the mineral owner and procuring the mining lease have
long plagued mineral development, particularly for oil and gas.
However, the magnitude of the coal reserves that may be required
to be aggregated to establish a feasible mining unit, and more
importantly, the nature of the mining process likely to be contemplated exacerbates the problems inherent in acquiring such
rights and may constitute barriers to the opening of new mines
and, additionally, preclude the efficient and optimum development of a vitally needed energy source.7
The large scale aggregation of reserves is required for
the opening of new mines by the dictates of coal conversion,8

6

the predominant market for expanded production.

A utility is

naturally reluctant to risk the capital required to erect a new
coal fired plant or to convert existing plants to coal without a
firm supply of reserves dedicated to the life of the plant.

To

successfully market coal to such a project, the mining operator
must have sufficient committed reserves or at least demonstrate
the ability to acquire such reserves, to fuel the plant for ap9
proximately 30 years.
Projections as to the amount of coal
required to fuel a moderate size coal fired plant for that period
of time range from 790 million tons for bituminuous, a high BTU
coal, to 1.5 billion tons for low BTU lignite.

10

Surface mining, where technologically feasible, will in all
probability be the mining process utilized in any coal development project.

In the coal mining industry, surface mined coal

production currently exceeds the output of deep mined coal,11
despite the fact that total strippable coal reserves comprise
only twelve percent of total recoverable coal reserves.

12

The

predominance of surface mining in the development of coal reserves is attributed to its being more economical than deep
mining,13 as it is less labor intensive,14 inherently safer15
and yields a greater ultimate recovery of coal reserves.

16

Sur-

face mine projects may also be more quickly developed than deep
mines.17

Furthermore, coal deposits located in close proximity

to the surface may only be developed by surface mining.
Surface mining involves the tearing away of the earth's
surface and the horizontal extraction of the minerals. Contour
mining, utilized in mountainous areas, involves the excavation of
a portion of the hill side to expose the seam and permit the

-
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removal of the coal.

A "highwall", a vertical bank which marks

the limit of the excavation, and a "bench", which is the relatively flat area remaining after the coal is removed, results.
19
"Area" strip mining,
applied to relatively flat topography

18

characteristic of the coal fields located west of the Mississippi,
entails the following sequence of events:

stripping of the top

soil by scrapers; removing the remaining overburden by a drag line;
and, extracting the coal from the seam by drilling or blasting.
Reclamation, the rehabilitation of the surface mined land in accordance with the environmental performance standards mandated by the
applicable state reclamation act or, in absence thereof, by the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 197720 (SMCRA) , is
integrated into and occurs simultaneously with the mining process
employed.

The equipment, depending upon the size of the mining

unit, typically involves high power shovels and drag lines that
frequently are the largest land moving machines in the world.

21

After processing, the coal has to be transported from the
mine to the coal fired plant which may be located vast distances
away.

To eliminate the high costs and other problems inherent in

the long distance transportation of coal, on-site utilization
has occurred or is planned, particularly with respect to low BTU
coal situated in the Southwest, in which a "mine mouth" coal
fired plant is erected near the mine site, with the generating
facilities clustered nearby to transmit the electricity by power
lines to the distant market.
Obviously, during the mining and reclaiming process the
surface of the land is radically disturbed and its beneficial
use is thereby forclosed for an extended period of time.

-
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The

mine operator may also deem it practical to occupy all of the
land within the confines of the mining unit for plant and equipment storage

and

utilization throughout the life of the project.22

Additionally, although exceptions to the contrary have been observed, the expectation is that the market and utility value of
23
the land will be lower after reclamation.
The amount of land necessary for inclusion in the mining
unit to accumulate a sufficient amount of committed reserves and
the complications inherent in surface mining increase the likelihood that some landowners will "hold out” , i.e., refuse to grant
the necessary rights to the mine operator.

The purpose of this

article is to examine the problem of "hold out"24 acreage and to
speculate on how its obvious solution, legislation requiring the
forced sale of the non-committed interest, should be structured
in order to be equitable and, as well, to encourage the most
25
efficient and optimum development of coal reserves.
An examination of the "hold out" acreage phenomena and its
potential legislative solution necessitates an analysis of the
fallowing relevant subjects:

the Surface Mining Control and

Reclamation Act of 1977; the mining rights incident to the surface mining of coal; the current practices in the industry of
acquiring such rights; and, finally, the structure and function
of the proposed statutory scheme, including compensatory measures.
The Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977

26

(hereinafter referred to as SMCRA) , a product of a long and tur-

-
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bulent congressional effort,

27

is central to any compulsory min-

ing right acquisition scheme which contemplates surface mining as
the process for coal extraction.

The applicable reclamation re-

quirements, particularly the environmental performance standards
which largely determines the consequence of surface mining to
the physical condition of the land, are relevant to the nature
of the property interest that the mining operator will have to
acquire as well as to the compensation to be paid.

Additionally,

when the "hold out" acreage is surrounded by or adjacent to reserves included within the mining unit, the ability to satisfy
the "offsite" environmental performance standards required to
surface mine the committed acreage will bear on the necessity of
the proposed statute.
Historically, surface mining has been distinguished by
severe environmental disturbances occasioned by inadequate or
non-existent reclamation attempts stemming from an absence of
effective regulatory legislation.2
8

Strip mining without ade-

quate reclamation disrupted vast areas of surface land, wildlife habitat and hydrological systems,

29

The landscape was

scarred by deep depressions and ugly spoil banks of overburden
incapable of supporting animal or plant life.

The instability

of the soil after stripping resulted in erosion and landslides.
Phosphates, pyrites or other highly mineralized or toxic materials drained from the mine site and polluted streams and lakes.
Blasting disrupted underground water formations and toxic or
acid water from the affected mine site leached into the underground water table and contaminated ground water supplies.

The

displacement of water in streams and lakes by silt and the ac-

-
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celerated rate or drainage from the bared stripped site resulted in widespread flooding.

The damage resulting from erosion,

landslides, flooding and water pollution as an incident of insufficient regulation of surface mining was not restricted to the
mine site but effected off-site areas, frequently encompassing
broad geographic zones, and yielded property damage, and oc30
casionally, personal injury,
to private individuals, as well
as severe disturbances of the environment.
Besides the grotesque disfiguration of the landscape, the
cumulative harm to the environment, and the visitation of the
evils of spoiled wells, polluted water and flooding of adjacent
property owners; inadequately restored lands frequently were
totally unproductive and failed thereafter to make any beneficial
31
contribution to the local economy.
The owners, generally the
mine operator, abandoned the property.

The assessed valuation

for ad valorem tax purposes was at most, de minimis, and the
tax base of the local community declined.

Strip mining with-

out adequate reclamation over a broad geographic area seriously
33
impacted on local economies and created pockets of poverty.
Congress, in passing the SMCRA, recognizing that, increased
surfaced mined coal production is inevitable if coal production
expands to meet the nations energy needs, intended to minimize
the attendant adverse environmental effects by making reclamation a prerequisite to the surface mining of coal.

In effect,

surface mining was only to be a temporary and not a terminal
land use.35

Basically, this goal was to be achieved by estab-

lishing a regulatory process in which antecedent to the actual
surface mining, the mine operator's reclamation plan, conform-

-
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ing Co Che basic environmental performance standards promulgated
in Che Act, is determined by Che regulatory agency Co be adequate,
feasible and capable of implementation Co ensure Che prospective
use and productivity of Che effected land.3
6

Thereafter, rigorous

application of effective enforcement provisions was Co ensure that
the reclamation scheme is effectuated as approved.

37

The fundamental theory of the Act is that surface mining is
Co be prohibited unless, with the burden of proof being placed
on the mine operator, the attendant detrimental environmental
effects, both on-site and off-site, can be avoided.

Also, by

merging the process of reclamation into the formative stage of
Che mining project, the Act further enhanced the opportunity
Co achieve effective reclamation.
mation are integrated:

Surface mining and recla-

no longer is stripping the paramount con-

cern of the mining operator with reclamation merely being an
"after thought" that is hastily conceived and poorly executed.

38

The increased emphasis on land restoration should result in
greater success in reclamation projects.

Additionally, as ade-

quate reclamation is expensive in that it requires methodical
and definitive planning and detailed construction efforts, the
Act externalizes that cost into the price of coal.
The SMCRA entails a complex statutory scheme which establishes a federal administrative agency, the Office of Surface
Mining and Reclamation Enforcement (OSMRE)

39

to administer

statutorily delineated environmental performance criteria and
stringent enforcement procedures to attain the legislatively
mandated standard of reclamation.

A federalist approach is also

incorporated in that a state may adopt its own statutory scheme,

-
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with appropriate enforcement procedures, so long as the environmental performance standards and enforcement provisions, as determined by the OSMRE, either equal to or exceed in their rigorousness the "minimum" standards contained in the Act.40
such state action, the SMCRA is applicable.

Absent

During the period

in which the states are promulgating their statutory scheme or
awaiting federal approval, interim regulations have been promulgated and enforced by the OSMRE.41

Due to the prolixity of

the federal regulations and the fact that most state programs
have not been approved by the OSMRE, merely the federal act
will be analyzed. 42
The statutory framework simply requires the mining opera43
tor to obtain a permit from the appropriate agency,
either
the federal OSMRE or the state agency administering the approved
state program, in order to undertake a strip mining project.
As a prerequisite to being granted, the application for the permit must describe the proposed mining and reclamation plan in
sufficient detail to affirmatively demonstrate that the reclamation plan can be accomplished.44

The plan must also demon-

strate, and the agency must find in writing, that certain statutory prescribed minimum environmental performance standards
will be satisfied

before the permit may be granted.4 5

Addi-

tionally, the application permit must describe in detail:
hydrology of the area;

46

the

the probable consequences of the mining

and reclamation on both the on-site and off-site hydrological
balance

49

and the agency must find, in writing, that the scheme

has been designed to prevent material hydrological damage to
the off-site area.48

The. permit, if issued, operates as follows: initially has
a duration o f five y e a r s will terminate for failure of the
operator to timely commence surface mining operations:50 may be
renewed beyond the five year period with respect to areas within
the boundaries of the plan;51 and, will terminate if the terms
and conditions of the approved plan are not being satisifed.

52

Reclamation, as contemplated by the approved plan, is ensured by the requirement that a performance bond be submitted,
prior to issuance of the permit, sufficient to pay a third party
to perforin all of the reclamation work in the event of forfeiture.

Additionally, continuous supervision of the imple-

mented reclamation project to ensure compliance with the permit
54
conditions is provided by on-site mine inspections,
along with
the submission of monthly reports containing55 in depth data on
the progress of the project by the mining operator.
Civil penalties of $5,000 fines per day may be assessed
56
for violations of any permit conditions.
Criminal penalties,
$10,000 per day fine or imprisonment of not more than one year
or both,57 is provided for willful and knowing violation of a
permit condition or the making of a known false representation
58
in a permit application.
The environmental performance standards establish the
minimum criteria for reclamation.

The central requirement is

that the land must be restored to its capability of supporting
its pre-mining use or environmentally acceptable higher or
better uses that are not impractical, unlawful or inconsistent
with applicable land use policies or involve unreasonable delay
59
in implementation.
As to prime agricultural lands, those

-
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designated by the Department of Agriculture as high yield crop
producers,

the operator must demonstrate that the post mining

productivity of the restored farm lands will sustain the premining high yields.

60

The "pre-mining or higher or better use"

requirement ensures that the mined land will be returned to at
least its pre-mining form of productivity and obviates the opportunity for convenience or economic attractiveness of a potential restoration scheme, such as the creation of a series
of artificial lakes, to dictate the reclamation effort and the
subsequent post mining land use.
The affected area, with some exceptions,
ed to its "approximate original contour"

62

61

must be restor-

which requires the

elimination of highwalls, spoil piles and depressions by backfilling, grading and, if necessary, compacting so that the land
after restoration will resemble its pre-mining general surface
configuration and will blend into and complement the drainage
pattern of the surrounding terrain.

63

The approximate original

contour requirement, although it clearly does not impose the
impossible task of achieving full restoration of the original
topography, has been criticized as precluding surface mining
or steep slopes in mountainous terrain characteristic of
Appalachia.64
A permanent vegetative cover consisting of diverse native
species, introduced species may be used under some circumstances,
capable of self-generation must also be established co-extensive
with the natural vegetative cover of the mined area.

65

The

re-established vegetation must support the utility of the post
mining land use plan as well as stabilize the surface soil in

-
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order to prevent erosion and siltation.

To assist the reveg-

atation effort, the top soil, which must be restored, has to be
removed in a separate layer, segregated from the toxic material
to avoid contamination during the stripping process.

The

mine operator is responsible for the survival of the re-established vegetation for a period of five years, or ten years in
arid or semi-arid conditions, after the last augmented vegetative effort, such as re-seeding or fertilizing occurs.

68

Additionally, the mine operator must also minimize the
consequences of surface mining to the hydrological balance

69

and

the quality of surface and ground water systems by using the best
technology available to avoid acid or other toxic mine drainage
or pollution;70 prevent sedimentation and siltation or surface
71
72
waters;
and, restore the recharge capacity of the acquifer.
The anticipated post mining condition of the land depends
to a large extent on the post mining land use plan which is
determined by the topography, dimensions of the coal seam and
overburden, soil type, precipitation, and other physical or environmental land characteristics which effect the mining and
reclamation plan.

However, at least prior to the implementation

of the SMCRA, examples of a higher or better land use resulting
from surface mined reclamation typically involved mountainous
terrain with a casual agricultural or grazing pre-mining land
use, which could only feasibly and economically be restored by
leveling the mined area, and, the market value increased due to
the lack of level land in the area.

However, economic effi-

ciency, consistent with engineering feasibility, will probably
dictate that reclamation is unlikely to result in restoration

-
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co an enhanced land use that improves the utility or value of
the land.
The evidence is conflicting as to whether reclamation of
surface mined land, in accordance with the minimum environmental
performance standards, to a condition supporting its pre-mining
use, typically agricultural or grazing activities, inevitably
results in land which is physically inferior, due either to
dimunition in utility or market value, to its pre-mining condition.

Evidence that reclaimed lands equal, or even exceed,

their pre-mining utility or productivity has been presented.

74

Critics of the industry and some landowners provide evidence
of diminished crop yields, ad valorem assessments and market
values.75

Some fear exists that the detrimental effects of re-

moving and replacing the overburden will not be known for years
76
after the conclusion of the reclamation process.
The Right to Surface Mine
Although less exacting state reclamation statutes, representing varying degrees of stringency as to land rehabilitation
requirements and enforcement efforts, have been in existence long
before the SMCRA,

the legal struggle between the mine opera-

tor and the landowner, in particular the severed surface estate
owner, has not focused on the performance of reclamation or the
functioning of such acts.

The primary conflict has traditionally

centered on whether the rights expressed or implied in the mining
grant were sufficient to allow the mine.

operator to extract

the mineral by methods, usually necessary to either fully exhaust

-
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or economically mine the property, which substantially interfered with or adversely effected the surface estate.

Initially,

when deep mining was the primary method of mining coal, the issue
was whether the mine
jacent78

operator was compelled to provide sub-

support by leaving adequate pillars of coal which may

have represented up to forty percent of the deposit79 to avoid
subsidence and its attendant damage to the surface estate.
The development of surface mining as the predominant and
most attractive method of producing coal injected a new dimension to the conflict existing between the surface estate, and the
severed mineral estate as to the extent of the burden imposed
upon the former by the latter's right to exploit the mineral.

80

The paramount issue is whether the owner of the mineral estate
has by implication, either implied in the instrument of severance or at law, the right to extract the mineral by surface
mining with its attendant disruption and consequent harm to the
surface estate. Case law resolving the issue has yielded the
two distinct positions.
The majority view, which is followed by most of the traditional coal producing states, holds that the surface estate is
entitled to be preserved in its natural condition undisturbed by
surface mining,81 even if the mineral owner is thereby precluded
82
from extracting the mineral.
The implied development easement,
i.e., the right of reasonable and necessary use of the surface
to explore for and extract the mineral implied in the grant to
secure to the mineral owner the ability to mine the substance
and, thus, to beneficially enjoy the acquired interest does not
include a right to surface mine.

-
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83

The traditionally accepted basis for this right, inherent
in the surface estate, of surface preservation as originating in
Harris v. Ryding

84

85

and Humphries v . Brogden,

is the mineral

owner's duty to provide subjacent support to the surface estate.

86

The right to subjacent support as a basis for denying an implied
right to strip mine has been explained as follows:

"... if....

the owner has a right to subjacent support . . . , (then)

. . .

he

has at least an equal right to hold entact the thing to be
87
supported, i.e., the surface . . . "
However, the failure to
imply such a right is based on reasoning identical to that underlying the common law imposition of the obligation to the

mineral estate to provide subjacent support:

the creation of the

surface estate, by the instrument of severance, with its consequent right of beneficial use and enjoyment evidences an intention,
in absence of express language to the contrary, that it is not
to be destroyed in the process of the legitimate use of the mineral estate.

88

Therefore, in states adhering to the majority view, the
right to surface mine must have been expressly included within
the grant if such right is imparted to the mineral owner by the
instrument of severance.

Almost, universally, the inquiry is

whether, according to the construction of the conveyance, the
parties contemplated surface mining - the removal of the overburden to extract the coal.

Kentucky alone resolves the issue

by determining whether the parties contemplated, as opposed to
a particular method of mining, that the mineral owners rights to
surface usage in extracting the mineral would be superior to any
competing rights of the surface owner.

-
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90

Thus, the right to surface nine as ah incident of the ownership of the mineral estate is governed by the intent of the
parties to the instrument of severance.

The intent is ascer-

tained by construing the instrument as of the date of its exec u t i o n and considering the attendant surrounding circumstances.
A waiver of subjacent support is a prerequisite to the existence
of such a right, but is not conclusive of the issue.9
2

The party

asserting the right to surface mine has the burden of proof.
Some differences in the methods utilized to ascertain the
existence of the requisite intent exists.

If the instrument does

not expressly prohibit or permit surface mining,9
4

some courts

construe the written language, with emphasis on the express development easement, and, in addition, as part of the surrounding
circumstances, look to the "common mining” practices, i.e., the
methods of mining then practiced in the geographic area.9
5

Some

courts further require that the language evidencing the right to
surface mine be clear and convincing; especially if the common
mining practices did not then include surface mining.

Other

jurisdictions have expanded the evidence of contemporaneous circumstances to encompass not only the common mining practices, but
to include the "totality of circumstances" bearing upon the probable intent of the parties.

Under this freewheeling inquiry,

evidence as to the amount of consideration paid for the mineral
rights acquired, including the express development easement, in
relation to the actual value of the land;

and, the physical

character of the land, i.e., whether the property was then improved agriculturally or unimproved mountainous land.

-
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99

As to the minority view, a California intermediate appellate court decision rendered over
Keys,

thirty years ago, Trklja v.

is the only case found unequivocally holding that a

mineral grant or reservation, by necessary implication, includes the right to destroy the surface in extracting the mineral.
The court specifically limited that right to instances in which
the substance cannot be mined by other less destructive methods.
However, the argument that the mining process contemplated by
the mining operatior, a dredge or dragline method, could only
be utilized it is was "not inconsistent” with the use of the
property being made by the surface owner was rejected.102

The

court's reasoning, obviously rejected by. the adherents to the
majority view, is that if the only method available to remove
the mineral is prohibited due to the surface disturbance involved, then the mineral owners' grant has been rendered "void”
as the enjoyment of the acquired interest has been denied.

103

Although the court's opinion did not so indicate, implicit in
its reasoning is an assumption that under such circumstances,
the parties to the conveyance, more probable than not, contemplated that the mineral could be extracted despite the radical
consequences resulting to the surface estate.
However, existing case law, even though there is no case
in point, in an influential natural resources producing state,
Texas, portends that a strong minority may exist.

Decisions

in that state intimate that the severed mineral owner, by virtue of the breadth of the implied easement of reasonable necessary surface usage, may be entitled under some circumstances
to extract the mineral by surface mining.

One such case is Sun Oil Co. v. Whittaker.

4
0
1
There, the

defendant, by conveyance in which the grantor retained the mineral interest, acquired the surface estate "subject to" the
plaintiff’s outstanding oil and gas lease.
ed a "free water" clause which provided:

The lease contain"Lessee shall have

free use of oil, gas, coal, wood and water from said land except from lessor's wells for all operations hereunder...
The Ogallala acquifer, a closed and isolated underground fresh
water reservoir, underlay the tract and was its only source of
water for domestic or irrigation purposes.

Such underground

water, not having been severed from the fee estate by a
previous reservation or conveyance, is a part of the surface
estate106 and was therefore owned by the surface owner.

The

defendant, a farmer, drilled wells and produced water from the
Ogallala Reservoir for domestic use and agricultural irrigation.
The plaintiff secured oil production, from the San Andres
formation, on the tract.

Thereafter, within the secondary term

of the lease production declined due to dimunition of the underground pressure in the reservoir.

Five years after the defen-

dant had commenced using the underground water, plaintiff initiated a secondary recovery "waterflooding" project to stimulate oil production.

The project, a reservoir repressuring

operation, involved the injection of an enormous amount of water
into the San Andres formation.

After a futile attempt to use

salt water, the plaintiff drilled a water well on the tract
and began taking 100,000 gallons of water per day from the
Ogallala Reservoir.

As that rate of consumption for the dura-

-
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tion of the project would diminish the life of the defendant's
dwindling water supply by eight years, the value of the surface
estate would be substantialy decreased.

The waterflood opera-

tion, however, would result in additional oil production valued
at over $3.2 million dollars.

Sufficient water for the pro-

ject was available and could have been purchased from the owners
of the other tracts in the area for $42,000.
The plaintiff brought suit to enjoin the defendant from
interfering with its production of water for use in the secondary recovery project.

The defendant crossclaimed to enjoin the

plaintiff from producing and using such water, and, additionally, sought actual and exemplary damages for the water so appropriated.

In the trial court, the defendant prevailed and was

awarded actual and exemplary damages and the plaintiff was
enjoined from producing and using the water in its waterflood
program.
On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals

108

perceived that

the plaintiff's right to free use of the defendant's water in
a secondary recovery project was solely governed by the applicability of the free water clause.

Finding that clause ambi-

guous as to whether the parties thereby intended to permit the
lessee to make, such extensive use of the water, it affirmed the
trial court's judgment on the basis that extrinsic evidence, admitted below, was sufficient to support the lower court's determination that such extensive use was not contemplated by the
parties.
In an opinion stressing the dominance of the mineral
estate, the Supreme Court, with four judges dissenting,

109

re-

versed the judgments of the lower courts and held that as the
waterflood operation was reasonably necessary to the production
of oil, the plaintiff, as the owner of the dominant mineral
estate, was entitled to the free use of the water as an incident of the implied development easement, i.e., "the free use
of such part and so much of the premises as is reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes of the lease, having due regards to the rights of the surface owner."110
The concept of accomodation between the mineral estate and
the surface estate inherent in the "reasonable necessity” and
"due regards" standard of the implied development easement had
previously been delineated in Getty Oil Co. v. Jones

111

which

h eld that the lessee must utilize a reasonable alternative method,
if available, when its contemplated use substantially interfered
with or precluded an existing use made by the surface owner.

As

water was available for purchase from other tracts in the area,
it would seem that the "reasonable alternatives" test of Getty
would preclude the lessee’s free use of the water.

However, the

court limited Getty by holding that test only applicable when
the reasonable alternative is located on the premises.

According

to the court, to force the plaintiff to purchase the necessary
water from other sources would be in "derogation" of its dominant mineral estate.

112

Also, the lower court’s determination that the free water
clause did not sanction such use of the water, based on the ascertained intent of the parties to the instrument of severance
derived from the extrinsic evidence, was rendered irrelevant by

-
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court held, affirming the judgment of the trial court, which
denied recovery to the plaintiff, that as the mining operator,
owner of the dominant estate, could only mine the sulphur by a
process which caused subsidence, the "reasonably necessary”
requirement of the implied development easement was satisfied
and the servient surface estate's right to subjacent support
was precluded by the applicability of the mining grant.1
7
1
As the mining practices in Whittaker resulted in the
dimunition of the surface owner's water supply and, consequently,
the market value of the surface estate, it essentially holds
that the dominant mineral estate, in the proper exercise of the
implied development easement, is entitled by law, without lia-

118
bility for damages, to destroy the surface estate.1
8
1
observation can be made of Texas Gulf Sulphur.

The same

The inferences

to be derived from both cases is that the severed surface estate
may be surfaced mined by the mining operator to recover a coal
deposit that can only be physically extracted, or perhaps, com119
mercially mined by surface mining.
As subsidence can result
in the complete destruction, eliminating any beneficial use of
the surface, and is the recognized theoretical foundation for
the holding that the surface estate is entitled to surface preservation, free from the interference and harm of surface mining, Texas Gulf Sulphur, indoubtably supports that inference.
However, the implication of the right to surface mine in
a deed of severance, as well as any such previously imparted
express rights, may be rendered insignificant by a legislative
act which insulates the surface owner from uninvited surface

-
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mining,1 2 0 "surface owner consent" statutes require the mine
operator to obtain the acquiesence of the surface owner to the
surface mining of the tract independent of any such previously
acquired right.

121

In effect, the surface owner is vested with

a statutory right to "veto" the mining of the tract and preclude

122

its inclusion within the mining unit.122

Obviously, if such

consent is granted by the surface owner, it won't be gratuitious
Of dubious constitutional validity,

such acts are indicative

that state legislation may be invoked to protect landowners124
from the burdens of surface mining and that such attempts may
not necessarily be structured to encourage the orderly development of coal reserves.
Acquiring Surface Mineable Coal Reserves
The nature of the property interests that the mining operator will have to acquire as a prerequisite to the surface
mining of a tract is determined by the particular jurisdiction's
treatment of the implied right to surface mine.

In a state in

which such a right is not recognized, the severance of the coal
interest from the surface interest necessitates that the mining
operator obtain a mining lease from the mineral owner, granting
the right to mine for coal, and, in addition, the consent of the
surface owner to the surface mining of the tract.1 2 5

If there

has been no severance of the coal from the surface estate, a
coal lease, containing an express right to surface mine, from
the landowner, will suffice.

126
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However, in a jurisdiction

which recognizes the implied right to surface mine as an incident to the implied development easement, a mining lease from the
owner of the coal interest will suffice even if that interest
has previously been severed from the surface estate.

The consent

to surface mine need only be acquired from the owner of the
severed surface estate in the event that the instrument of severance specifically precluded such surface destruction or reasonable alternatives to the extraction of the minerals by surface mining exist.
The actual practices of acquiring coal reserves reflect
the complications implicit in obtaining mining rights that
substantially impact on the land and in which, depending upon
the jurisdiction, the respective rights of the severed mineral
and surface estates as to the coal or the right to surface mine
may

not yet have been delineated.

title to the coal is clouded

In some jurisdictions, the

due to the existence of a grant

or reservation in which the coal is not specifically identified
but the expansive term "mineral" is utilized.

128

In such a

grant or reservation, the coal may or may not have been severed from
or retained by the surface estate.

Endemnic to oil and gas

conveyances, such language is characteristic of mineral transactions occurring in areas experiencing oil and gas exploration
activities.
mine, as

The applicability of the implied right to surface

a matter of law, also may not have been judicially as-

certained.

Furthermore, the possibility exists that the sur-

face owner, bearing the burden of surface mining, may have an
interest that amounts to a "veto" over the surface mining of the
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tract, and does have some ill-defined right to participate in
the formulation of the reclamation129 plan, and yet, is not
entitled to the economic benefits, the royalties and advance
royalties, traditionally associated with mineral development.
As a result, it is not uncommon for the mining operator
contemplating surface mining to purchase the land outright,130
i.e., to obtain both the surface and mineral fee estates, even
though acquiring the mining rights by leasing requires "less up
front" money.

Acquiring a mining lease from both the mineral

and surface estate owners and, in effect, paying double royalties and advance royalties is also a prevalent practice.
Leasing the surface owner, as well as the mineral owner, procures
the prerequisite consent when the holder of the coal title lacks
an express or implied right to surface mine, and, additionally,
also secures the necessary mining rights by binding all possible claimants, i.e., the surface and mineral owners, to the disputed coal title created by an instrument of severance which
contains the inclusive but undefined term "minerals," or other
kindred language within the grant.

Additionally, in the western

states where the doctrine of prior appropriation may result in
an adjacent tract owner having title to appurtenant surface waters,
it is not uncommon for a mining operator to acquire the water
rights by a mining lease which grants that party the right to
receive royalties and advance royalties in order to lessen the
potential impact of third party water rights on the surface
mining project.

133

Acquisition of the fee ownership of the land outright, in
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particular as to the surface estate, is advantageous to the
mining operator in that it eliminates the potential disputes
that may arise over the landowner's status during the mining
process or the formulation, implementation or eventual outcome
of reclamation.134

Leasing the surface owner not only obtains

the requisite express right to surface mine or ensures title
to coal that ultimately may be determined not to have been
severed from the surface estate by the term "minerals", or other
similar equivocal language in the grant; but, additionally,
the obligation to pay "surface royalties" vests an economic
interest in the surface mining of the tract in the likely principal antagonist to the mining venture, the surface owner, and
thereby lessens the opportunity for differences to arise between
the mining operator and the landowner over the mining and reclamation process.
Despite the possibility that the mining operator may offer
to purchase the land outright or to pay surface royalties, the
acquisition of the surface mineable coal reserves, even at a high
price, will be difficult.

For a multiplicity of reasons, not

the least of which is that it may require foregoing a present
livelihood such as farming, or ranching, selling the land or
surface estate outright, either as an incident of or independent
of the sale of the coal, may not be acceptable to the respective landowner regardless of the financial inducement.

Further-

more, the potential for fragmented ownership of the necessary
mining rights in some jurisdictions, i.e., requiring successful
negotiations with both surface and mineral owners; and, the
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attendant disruption to the surface state, including the possible dislocation of the surface owner, along with the justifiable
apprehension as to the utility and value of the land after reclamation, forewarns that attempts to acquire the necessary mining rights by mining lease, even if munificent surface and mineral royalties and bonuses are paid, will often fail.
The Problem of Hold Out Acreage
Not only does the hold out acreage phenomena have the
potential to preclude the aggregation of sufficient coal reserves necessary to establish a mining unit that conforms to
the market for coal conversion or that renders the project
economically feasible, but, the impact to the hold out acreage
from surface mining in the unit may preclude compliance with
the reclamation act as to the committed acreage and, thus, also
condemn the mining project.

In effect, the environmental

characteristics of the specific mine site such as the topography, dimension and chemical composition of the coal seam and
overburden, and the nature of the hydrological system may inherently portend that the unavoidable impact of surface mining
to the hold out acreage is so adverse as to preclude compliance with the requisite minimum environmental performance standards that accord protection to off-site areas.
The most omnious example of holdout acreage frustrating
the acquisition of the surface mining permit for committed
acreage is the "toadstool" phenomena.1
5
3
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When coal deposits

chat are characterized by either a massive coal seam or an overburden that is slight in relation to the thickness of the coal
seam are surfaced mined from tracts that are adjacent to or surround non-committed acreage, the non-mined lands, reposing at
their original elevation, will protrude above the recessed
mined and reclaimed lands, creating a terrain that resembles
a field of "toadstools.
The extended elevation in relationship to the adjacent
area will likely affect the utility of the non-mined lands in
that, for example, irrigation by surface or ground waters will
be precluded.

137

The prospect of such a distorted terrain and

the consequent detriment to the off-site tracts will likely
result in a denial of the surface mining permit for the committed
acreage due to:

the impact to the hydrological system of the

non-mined lands violating the SMCRA's minimum off-site water protection standards, i.e., by inevitably causing "material damage
138
to the hydrological balance outside the permit area"1
8
3
inher-

ently disrupting the local physical environment;

139

or, the

failure to formulate a satisfactory post mining land use plan
for such an area.140
Even if the consequences of surface mining to off-site
areas will not be as pronounced as the anticipated detrimental
effect of the toad stool phenomena, the specific characteristics
of the mine site can preindicate that compliance with the offsite environmental performance standards, in particular of the
surface and ground water protection requirements, will be difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy when hold out acreage, in
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particular of tracts located wholly within the unit, is encountered.

Thus, the protection accorded to off-site areas by the

applicable reclamation act may prevent the mining operator from
merely ignoring the existence of the non-committed tracts and
proceeding with the mining of the committed acreage.
However, should the reclamation act be satisfied as to
offsite area protection, surface mining would still impact adversely on the hold out acreage.

The noise and dust associated

with the blasting and removing of the overburden by the huge
earth moving equipment, along with the clogging of the access
roads by trucks and other vehicles, may render occupation or
utilization of tracts immediately adjacent to or surrounded by
the mine site extremely impractical.

I
1
4n effect, withholding

land from the contemplated mining unit to avoid the interference
with the surface usage occasioned by surface mining may to a
large extent be ah illusory act of self preservation.
Isolating the mine site from adjacent landowners to facilitate compliance with the applicable offsite reclamation protection
standards and to mitigate the impact of surface mining to such
tracts can, however, be accomplished by acquiring tracts adjacent
to and surrounding the mining unit, not for mining purposes, but
142
to act solely as a protective "barrier" to such off-site areas.
Limiting the exposure for liability to adjacent landowners for
nuisance, failure to provide lateral support, or for damages
resulting from a failure to comply with the reclamation act is
a further inducement for the mining operator to establish such
a barrier.
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Nevertheless, interspersing tracts between the minesite
and privately owned lands to prevent the non-commit ted acreage
from frustrating compliance with the requisite off-site performance standards of the reclamation act may not be a feasible or
optimum solution for the mine operator.

The inability to ac-

quire such strategically located lands or the incidence of
the occurrence of the holdout acreage may render the utilization
of such a plan impractical or impossible.

More importantly, if

commercially mineable coal underlies the tracts adjacent to such
holdout acreage, utilizing such tracts to barricade the minesite
may only further exclude reserves that are necessary or convenient
to the establishment and operation of the mining unit.
Timely development of a much demanded energy resource is
not the only loss occasioned by permitting holdout acreage to
block the opening of a logical mining unit:

the owners of the

mining rights to the reserves underlying the other tracts in the
unit, including prospective mine operators who have acquired
coal leases or other mining rights, will be deprived of the
benefits, such as the royalties, surface royalties, or other
profits or advantages to be deprived from the mining of the coal.
Since the deposit underlying the various tracts can only be
developed as a unit, the holder of any of the necessary mining
rights can veto the surface mining of its particular tract and,
thus, deny to the remaining owners of the mining rights in the
deposit the beneficial enjoyment of their property interest,
i.e., the right to exploit their mineral interest.
Furthermore, even if the holdout acreage does not effec-
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tively forclose the opening of the mine, its omission from the
mining project may forever doom the mining and utilization of
the underlying coal reserves in that economies of scale may
render the remaining scattered non-mined tracts uneconomical to
surface mine.144

Assuming that a market, conceivably a spot

market, will exist for that amount of coal excluded from the
original mining unit; it may not be economically feasible to
acquire a surface mining permit, move on a dragline or other
equipment necessary to surface mine and reclaim, to recover
the amount of reserves underlying such isolated tracts.

The

failure to achieve the "maximum optimum recovery" of the coal
reserves may result.

In effect, physical waste of a valuable

and needed non-renewable natural resource, which is inimical to
the theory and practice of sound natural resources development
145
and conservation.
1
4
5
is apt to be the distinguishing trait of the
large scale development of coal reserves under circumstances in
which the landowner may withhold his acreage from the mining
project.
The Legislative Solution
The solution to the problem is state legislation which empowers the mine operator with the right to acquire, for a fair
compensation, the necessary mining rights to the hold out acreage.

Based on the need to facilitate development, prevent waste

and protect the correlative rights of the owners of a valuable
and demanded natural resource, such a statute would be a v alid

-

30

-

exercise of the state police p o w e r . Similar
6
4
1
reasons justified and sustained the validity of state compulsory pooling

147

and unitization statutes,148 which, in effect, mandated compulsory integration of oil and gas interests and as to the former
statute, may require a forced sale of the mineral interest.

149

Even though such a statute could simply bestow upon the mine
operator a broad and unqualified private right of condemnation,
along with a formula of fair compensation for the condemned
interests; the structure of the typical oil and gas compulsory
unitization statute is easily adaptable to the hold out acreage
phenomena and can be modified to insure that property interests
will only be condemned pursuant to the objectives of accelerated
and prudent natural resources development.
Thus, the statute would vest the appropriate state conservation agency with jurisdiction to delineate and establish a
surface coal mine unit

when necessary "to promote optimum

development of coal reserves, prevent waste, and protect correlative rights."

The mine operator would have to demonstrate,

and the agency so find, that is it "uneconomic or impractical"
to mine the hold out acreage as individual tracts, or in the alternative, to mine the committed acreage without the hold out
acreage,

The agency would further have to determine that, pur-

suant to the proposed mine plan, the coal reserves in the unit
can be developed in an "efficient, economic and orderly method."
Should the jurisdictional requirements be satisfied after proper
notice and hearing on the merits, the statute would require the
agency to order the consolidation of the tracts within the unit
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152

area into an integrated mining unit and effectuate a transfer
of the mining rights to the non-committed acreage to the mine
153
operator.
To permit a proposed determination of unit boundaries,
the statute should provide the mine operator with the right to
acquire, for a fair compensation, access to conduct coal exploratory activities, such as core drilling, on lands that may
be included within the mine unit.

Such exploratory activities

should be limited to ascertaining the extent and characteristics
of the underlying coal deposit.

The information acquired would

be transmitted to the affected property owners.

Adequate safe-

guards would be delineated to ensure that the interference with
the surface estate activities would be limited.
Also, as opposed to merely being applicable to coal mineral
and surface owner interests, the act should operate to mandate
compulsory inclusion of coal leasehold interests into the unit.
Hold out acreage can result from an intractable coal lessee's
refusal to pool or otherwise commit it's acreage

to the unit.

If accelerated and enlightened development of coal reserves
demand forced acquisition of mineral and surface owner interests,
a similarly situated coal lessee should be subject to the same
hazards,
Furthermore, the agency, upon a petition of the owner of the
coal interest to a tract situated adjacent to the proposed or
established unit area, should also be empowered to compell the
inclusion of the tract into the unit, despite the mine operator's
objection.

Thus, coal less economically attractive to the mine
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operator may be developed to the benefit of the mineral owner
and the public.

The impossibility of the mine operator's

marketing such coal would preclude such agency action.
Of obvious importance and inherently susceptible to controversy, is the compensation to be paid to the owners of the
effected property interest.

As to the surface owner, some gui-

dance exists in that the Opencast Coal Act of 1958,

154

a stat-

utory scheme regulating surface mining of coal in Great Britain,
specified the compensation to be paid to owners of the surface
estate subjected to surface mining.

Also, throughout the period

in which Congress was attempting to enact surface mining legislation, culminating in the SMCRA of 1977, various proposals to
regulate surface mining on western coal lands in which the coal
is federally owned and the surface estate is privately owned
were advanced. 1 5 5 Some of these proposals attempted to establish
a system of compensation for the surface owner consenting to
surface mining.
These statutes are typically characterized by the failure
to provide for the condemnation of the full fee interest and
the extent of the compensation to be accorded to the surface
o w n e r . 5
L
6
1oss of the beneficial enjoyment of the surface
estate was only to occur during the period in which the surface
estate was actually disturbed and the surface owner was to be
recompensed for damaged proximately caused by the surface mining and the consequent interruption to the surface estate.
Such compensation encompassed damages for the annual rental value
of the land, loss of income, cost of relocating, loss incurred
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from the forced sale of machinery and livestock, and any
dimunition of value to the land.157

Additionally, even

though not incorporated into any of the above statutory
schemes, surface owner royalties, especially if widely
utilized in the field, can also be included within the
compensation formula.
Compensation for the acquired coal interest can take
the form of a royalty interest, likely to be based on the
prevailing royalty paid in the field, along with a bonus,
the fair market value of the development right; or, its
proportionate share of the producation, minus its proprotionate share of the costs of development.158

The latter

is identical to the common law treatment of a non-consenting
159
cotenant
when a concurrent owner develops the mining
property which, with some deviation, is the treatment
typically accorded the non-assenting oil and gas mineral
owner under forced pooling statutes.160

However, the

problems that may be encountered in allocating the costs
incurred in the formation and operation of a long lived
large scale surface mine project to specific tracts, which
will be mined at different times, may render the application
of a net production formula impractical.

Furthermore, a

proportionate net production formula of compensation may
not provide a sufficient economic attractive inducement to
the mine operator to develop holdout acreage.16
1
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CONCLUSION
Although condemnation of property interests, in particular of the surface estate, is not a remedy to be unreluctantly adopted, the public interest requires that
holdout acreage not impede the expeditious and enlightened
development of surface mineable coal reserves.
Legislation can remedy the problem.

The proposed

statutory framework and potential compensation formulas
are not offered as the definitive solution but merely to
serve as the departure point for the diligent and meticulous consideration required to perfect a fair and feasible
legislative solution.

Any such legislative solution to the

problem must balance the public's demand for energy resources
with the fair treatment due the property owner by establishing
that a degree of necessity must exist before the mine operator
may compulsorily acquire the holdout interests, providing
for payment of fair and just compensation to the property
owners, and, ensuring that the economic and efficient development of coal reserves results.

Obtaining such

legislation,

due to the competing interests involved, will not be an
easy task and the attention and expertise of the mineral
practitioner and the land person is required to ensure that
the definitive statutory solution is achieved so that when
enacted, it will be as successful as the legislation that
pioneered state regulation of mineral resources, compulsory oil and gas pooling and unitization statutes.
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equivalent to surrounding non-mined prime farm lands violated the 5th Amendment and the 10th Amendment. An appeal to the
Supreme Court has been perfected and probable jurisdiction
has been noted by the Court.
49 L.W. 3245.

27.

Beginning with the first session of the 92nd Congress, in
1972, Congress attempted to enact legislation regulating
surface mining of coal. One such bill that was reported
out of Congress, "The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1974" was pocket vetoed by President Ford. A similar
bill, "The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1975" was vetoed by President Ford the following session
of Congress.
For an account of the legislative history of
the bill through 1975, see Dunlap, An Analysis of the Legislative History of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1975, 21 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 11 (1975).
For the 1977 Act, see, Broyles, A synopsis of the Federal
and Arkansas Surface Mining Acts.
1977, 17th Annual Arkansas Nat. Resources Inst, (1978); Kite, The Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977: An Overview of Reclamation Requirements and Implementation, 13 Land and Water
L. Rev. 703 (1977); Swift, Implementation of the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 from the Coal
Operator's Perspective, 25 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 4-1
(1979).

28.

H.R, Rep., supra note 18 at 58.
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29.

Id.

See also, 42 U.S.C.A. 1201(c).

30.

H.R. Rep., supra note 18 at 60.
51201(c).

31.

See generally, Hearings on H.R. 60 Before the Subcomm. on
Hines and Mining of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92nd Cong., 1st sess., ser. no. 92-26, at 76,
117, 547 (1972).

32.

Id. at 117, 547.

33.

Id.

34.

30 U.S.C.A. §1201(c) and (d) and 51202(c).

35.

Id. at §1201(d) and §1202(e).
supra note 18 at 93.

36.

H.R. Rep., supra note 18 at 91.

37.

Id. at 128.

38.

Id. at 96.

39.

30 U.S.C.A. §1211.

40.

Id. at §1253.

41.

Id. at §1252(b).

42.

30 C.F.R. §§700-837 (1978).

43.

30 U.S.C.A. §1256.

44.

Id. at §1258.

45.

Id. at §1260(b).

46.

Id. at §1254(b)(11).

47.

Id.

48.

Id. at §1260(b)(11).

49.

Id. at §1256(b).

50.

Id. at 1256(b), which provides that the permit shall terminate if operations under the permit are not initiated within
three years from the date of its issue.
However, "reasonable extensions" may be granted, if necessary, due to
"litigation", "threatening economic loss", or reasons beyond the control, without contributing fault or negligence,
of the permittee.
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See also, 42 U.S.C.A.

See also, House report,

51.

I d . at §1256(d)(1).

52.

Id.

53.

Id. at §1259.

54.

Id. at §1267(a).

55.

Id. at §1267(b).

56.

Id. at §1268(a).

57.

Id. at §1268(e).

58.

Id. at §1268(d).

59.

Id. at §1265(b)(2).

60.

Id. at §1260(d).

61.

Id. at §1265(c).

62.

Id. at §1265(b)(3).

63.

H.R. Rep., supra note 18 at 97.

64.

Id.

65.

30 U.S.C.A.

66.

Id.

67.

§1265(5).

Id.

68.

Id at §1265(b)(20).

69.

The Act also requires the surface mining operator to replace the water supply of a property owner that has been
adversely affected by the surface coal mining operations.
30 U.S.C.A. 1307.

70.

Id. at §1265(b)(10)(a).

71.

Id. at §1265(b)(10)(b).

72.

Id. at 1265(b) (10) (d) .

73.

See, Hearings on H.R. 2 Before the Subcomm. on Energy and
the Environment of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st. Sess., ser 95-1, pt. 2, at 1013, 79-80, 328, 381 (1977); Hearings on S. 425, supra
note 23, pt. 2, at 1372-73, 1393.

74.

See, Hearings on H.R. 2, ser. 95-1, supra note 73, pt. 2,
916.
-7-

75.

See, Hearings on H.R. 2, ser. 95-1, supra note 73, p t . 4,
16-21, 25, 30, 47, 55-63, 79-80, 90; Hearings on H.R. 3,
ser. 93-11, supra note 12, pt. 2, 1227, 1306-7, 1566-67;
and, Hearings on H.R. 60, ser. no. 92-26, supra note 30,
796, 799-800.
The testimony of the witnesses cited herein
reflects particular skepticism of the industry's claims of
successful restoration to pre-mining productivity levels.

76.

See, Hearings on H.R. 2, ser. 95-1, supra note 73, pt. 4,
56, 80; and, Hearings on S. 425, supra note 23, pt. 2,
at 1001.

77.

For a complete description and analysis of the state reclamation acts in existence prior to the enactment of the
SMCRA of 1977, see, Hearings on H.R. 2, ser. 95-1, pt. 4,
261-418.

78.

See, Casper, the Police Power and the Third Estate, 53
Dick. L. Rev. 277 (1949); Donley, Coal Mining Rights and
Privileges, 52 W. Va. L. Rev. 32 (1950); Montgomery, "The
Development of the Right of Subjacent Support and the Third
Estate in Pennsylvania, 25 Temp. L. Q. 1 (1951); Williams,
Coal and the Third Estate, 58 Dick. L. Rev. 146 (1954);
Note, Extinguishment of the Right to Subjacent Support, 3
Ala. L. Rev. 241 (1951); Note, the Right to Subjacent Support, 19 Tenn. L. Rev. 982 (1947).

79.

Donley, supra note 79 at 32.

80.

Donley, Some Observations on the Law of Strip Mining, 11
Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 123 (1963); Ferguson, Severed Surface and Mineral Estates - Right to Use, Damage or Destroy
the Surface to Recover Minerals, 19 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst.
411 (1974); Patton, Recent Changes in Correlative Rights
of Surface and Mineral Owners, 18 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst.
19 (1973); Sargeant, Mineral Lessee's Right to Strip Mine,
19 Wash § Lee L. Rev. 276 (1962); Schneider, Strip Mining
in Kentucky, 59 Ky. L. J. 652 (1971); Twitty, Law of Subjacent Support and the Right to Totally Destroy the Surface in Mining Operations, 6 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 497
(1961); Comment, The Common Law Right to Subjacent Support
and Surface Preservation, 35 Mo. L. Rev. 234 (1973);
Comment, the Implied Right to Strip Mine Coal, 58 W. Va. L.
R e v . 174 (1956); Note, Duty of Uranium Miner to Support
Surface Estate, 10 Wyo. L. J . 239 (1956).

81.

Benton v. U.S. Manganese Corp., 229 Ark. 181, 313 S.W.2d
839 (1958); Smith v. Moore, 172 Colo 440, 474 P.2d 794
(1970); Barker v. Mintz, 73 Colo 411, 262 P. 534 (1923);
Dept. of Forests & Parks v. George's Creek Coal and Land Co. ,
250 Md. 125, 242 A.2d 165 (1968); Skivolocki v. East Ohio
Gas Co., 38 Ohio St. 2nd 244, 313 NE2d.374 (1974); Franklin
v. Callicoat, 53 Ohio A p . 240, 119 N.E.2d 688 (1954);
Stewart v. Chernicky, 439 Pa. 43, 226 A.2d 259 (1970); New
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Charter Coal Go. v. McKee, 411 Pa. 307, 191 A.2d 830
(1963); Wilkes-Barre Township School Dist. V. Corgan, 403
Pa. 383, 170 A. 2d 97 (1961).; Commonwealth v. Fitz Martin,
376 Pa. 390, 102 A.2d 893 (1954); Roches v. Duricka 374
Pa. 262, 97 A.2d 825 (1953); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 364
Pa. 422, 72 A.2d 568 (1950); Brown v. Crozier Coal & Land
Co., 144 W. Va. 296, 107 S.E.2d 777 (1959); Oresta v.
Romano Bros., 137 W. Va. 633, 73 S.E.2d 622 (1952); West
Virginia_Pittsburg Coal Co. v. Strong, 129 W. Va. 832,
42 S.E. 2d 46 (1947); Phipps v. Leftwich, 216 Va. 706,
222 S.E.2d 536 (1976).
82.

Moss v. Jourdan, 92 S. 689 (1922).
This anamolous situation is not unique to surface mining:
the mineral owner
may be required "to leave every point of coal untouched
under the land," if necessary to support the surface.
Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474, 50 A. 2d. 255. (1901) .

83.

Skivolocki v. East Ohio Gas Co., 38 Ohio St. 2nd 244, 313
Ne. 2d 374, 377 N. 1 (1974).
See also, Barker v. Mintz,
73 Colo 411, 262 P. 534, 535 (1922); and, Ferguson, Severed Surface and Mineral Estates - Right to Use, Damage
■■■ or Destroy the Surface to Recover the Mineral, 19 Rocky
Mt. Min. L. Inst. 411, 418 (1974).

84.

151 Eng. Rep. 27 (Ex. 1839).

85.

116 Eng. Rep 1048 (Q.B. 1850).

86.

Benton v. U.S. Manganese Corp., 229 Ark. 181, 313 S.W.2d
839 (1958); Barker v. Mintz, 73 Colo 411, 262 P. 534 (1923);
Skivolocki v. East Ohio Gas C o . , 38 Ohio St. 2d 244, 313
N.E.2d 374 (1974); Franklin v. Callicoat, 53 Ohio Ap. 240,
110 N.E.688 (1954); Commonwealth v. Fitzmartin, 376 Pa.
390, 102 A.2d 893 (1954); Brown v. Crozier Coal & Land Co.
144 W. Va. 296, 107 S.E.2d 777 (1959); Oresta v. Romano
Bros., 137 W. Va. 633, 73 S.E.2d 622 (1952); W. Va. Pittsburgh Coal v. Strong, 129 W. Va. 832, 42 S.E.2d 46 (1949).

87.

West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Strong, 129 W. Va. 832,
42 S.E.2d 46, 51 (1947).

88.

In Harris v. Ryding, supra note, at 31, Baron Parke in his
concurring opinion observed:
"This is the true construction of the deed, in order
to make it operate according to the intention of the
parties.
It never could have been in their contemplation that, by virtue of the reservation of the mines,
the grantor should be entitled to take the whole of
the coal and let down the surface, or injure the enjoyment of it; it is very like the case of the grant of
an upper room in the house, with the reservation by
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the grantor of a lower room, he undertaking not to
do anything which will derogate from the right to
occupy the upper room; and if he were to remove the
supports of the upper room, he would be liable in an
action of covenant; for the grantor is not entitled
to defeat his own act by taking away the underpinnings
from the upper room.
So in this case, he would be
acting in derogation of his grant, if he were to take
away from the whole of the coal below, he having
granted the use of the surface to the grantee."
89.

See, Skivolocki v. East Ohio Gas Co., 38 Ohio St.2nd 244,
247, 313 N.E.2d 374, 376 (1974) and, the numerous cases
cited in Annot:
70 A.L.R.3d 383, (1976).

90.

See, Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 at
397 (1968) in which the court stated:
"Whether or not the parties actually contemplated or
envisioned strip or auger mining is not important question is whether they intended that the mineral
owner's rights to use the surface in removal of minerals would be superior to any competing right of
the surface owner."
See also, Peabody Coal Co. v. Pasco, 452 F.2d 1126 (CA 6,
1971).
Kentucky has been liberal in construing coal conveyances
to encompass the right to surface mine.
See, Schneider,
supra note 81, and, note: Kentucky:
Experience with the
Broad Form Deed, 67 Ky. L.J. 107 (1963) for an analysis
of the relevant cases.

91.

See, Annot; supra note 89 at §2(a).

92.

Benton v. U.S. Manganese Corp. 229 Ark. 181, 313 S.W.2d
839 (1958); Smith v. Moore, 172 Colo. 440, 474 P.2d 794.
(1970); Skivolocki v. East Ohio Gas Co., 38 Ohio St.2nd
244, 313 N .E .2d 374 (1974); Franklin v. Callicoat, 53
Ohio Ap. 240, 119 N.E.2d 688 (1954); Stewart v. Chernicky,
439 Pa. 43, 226 A.2d 259 (1970) ; Brown v. Crozier Creek
Coal & Land Co., 144 W. Va. 296, 107 S.E.2d 777 (1959);
Phipps v. Leftwich, 216 Va. 706, 222 S.E.2d 536 (1976).

93.

Skivolocki v. East Ohio Gas C o . , 38 Ohio St. 244, 313 N.E.
2d 374 (1974); Stewart v. Chernicky, 439 Pa. 43, 266 A.2d
259 (1970); Phipps v. Leftwich, 216 Va. 706, 222 S.E.2d
536 (1976).

94.

A deed granting the "right to strip mine the surface" for
"fire clay" was construed as granting the mineral owner
the privilege of surface mining even though modern stripping methods were unknown at the date of the execution of
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Heidt v. Aughenbaugh Coal Co., 406 Pa. 188,
the grant.
176 A.2d 400 (1962).
See also, Tokas V.J.J. Arnold Co.,
122 W. Va. 613, 11 S.E.2d 759 (1940) for language in a
deed specifically granting the right to surface mine.
95.

Smith v. Moore, 172 Colo. 440, 494 P.2d 794 (1970); D e p t .
of Forests & Parks v. George’s Creek Coal & Land Co., 250
Md. 125, 242 A . 2d 165 (1965); Skivolocki v. East Ohio Gas
Co., 38 Ohio St.2nd 244, 313 N.E.2d 394 (1974); Franklin
v. Callicoat, 53 Ohio Ap. 240, 119 N.E.2d 688 (1954);
Wilkes-Barre Township School Dist. v. Corgan, 403 Pa. 383,
170 A.2d 97 (1961); Phipps v. Leftwich, 216 Va. 706, 222
S.E.2d 536 (1976); Oresta v. Romano Bros., 137 W. Va. 633,
73 S.E.2d 622 (1952); West-Virginia Pittsburgh Coal Co.
v. Strong, 129 W. Va. 832, 42 S.E.2d 46 (1947).

96.

Stewart v. Chernicky, 439 Pa. 43, 226 A.2d 259 (1970);
Commonwealth v. Fitzmartin, 376 Pa. 390, 102 A.2d 893
(1954); Phipps v. Leftwich, 216 Va. 706, 222 S.E.2d
536 (1976).

97.

Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky.
1968); Dept. of Forests & Parks v. George's Creek Coal 6c
Land Co., 250 Md. 1925, 242 A.2d 165 (1968); Commonwealth
v. Fitzmartin, 376 Pa. 390, 102 A.2d 893 (1954); Rochez
v. Duricka, 374 Pa. 422, 72 A.2d 568 (1950); Phipps v.
Leftwich, 216 Va. 706, 222 S.E.2d 536 (1976).

98.

Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky.
1968); Dept. of Forests & Parks v. George's Creek Coal &
Land Co., 250 Md. 125, 242 A.2d 165 (1968).

99.

Id.

100.

49 Cal. App. 2d 211, 121 P.2d 54 (1942).

101.

In Banks v. Tennessee Mineral Products Corp., 202 N.C. 408,
163 S.E. 108 (1932); the grantor reserved in the conveyance of the property to the plaintiff's predecessor-intitle ".... the mineral interest on and in .... together
with the right to ingress, regress and egress .... with the
necessary mining privileges for the operation of said mineral rights ...." Thereafter, the grantor executed a
mining lease to the defendant mining operator who subsequently mined a shallow feldspar deposit by open pit
mining.
The plaintiff, basing his action on the failure
of the defendant to provide subjacent support, sued to recover the damages resulting to the surface estate.
The court, construing the severance deed to determine the
intent of the parties, held that it was not contemplated
that the surface estate would be entitled to subjacent
support.
In so holding, the court emphasized the seemingly
broad language, i.e., "necessary mining privileges for the
operation of said mineral rights; and, more importantly,

the close proximity of the mineral deposit to the surface
which precluded the possibility of mining the substance and
providing subjacent support.
Further, that open pit mining
constituted the accepted and prevailing method of mining
feldspar in the locality.
Subsequently, in English v. Harris Clay C o ., 225 N.C. 467,
33 S.E.2d 329 (1945), the court was again faced with the
identical issue in a case involving similar facts except
that the severance deed merely reserved "...all the minerals and mining rights ....” The court noted that cases
which hold that the mineral owner owes a duty of subjacent support primarily involve coal or other minerals
traditionally extracted by subterrean mining in which subjacent support may be readily provided consistent with the
mining of the deposit.
Therefore, the implication of such
an obligation to the mineral estate is consistent with the
probable expectations of the parties.
However, as to minerals such as feldspar, which are located near or on the
surface and are commonly surface mined, the doctrine of
subjacent support, based on the presumed expectations of
the parties, is of "doubtful application." The court
then held, noting that it was reaffirming Banks, that under
such circumstances the doctrine of subjacent support is
either inapplicable or is waived by implication.
102.

Trklja v. Keys, 49 Col. App .2d
55 (1942).

211, 212; 121 P.2d 54,

103.

Id.

104.

483 S.W.2d 808 (1972). The present opinion was substituted for a previous opinion in favor of the surface owner
which was withdrawn by the Supreme Court. Also, prior to
that, the case had already been before the Supreme Court.
For a history of the case, see Gray, A New Appraisal of
the Rights of Lessees under Oil and Gas Leases to Use and
Occupy the Surface, 20 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 227, 245
(1975).

105.

483 S.W.2d

106.

Fleming Foundation v. Texaco, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 846 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1960; writ ref'd, N.R.c.), cited at 483 S.W.
2d at 811.

107.

At the trial, the parties also stipulated as to the following facts:
the waterflood process for the production
of oil is a reasonable and proper operation; and, the use
of the Ogallala water in conducting secondary recovery of
oil by water flooding and the location of the injection
wells and the rates of water injection so conducted by
the lessee also constituted reasonable and proper operations. Id.

at 810.
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108.

457 S.W.2d 96 (1969).

109.

The dissenting opinion, by Mr. Justice Daniel, opined that
the judgment of the lower courts' should have been affirmed
on the following ground:
the free water clause, as applied
to secondary recovery operations, was ambiguous and the
extrinsic evidence indicated that the parties to the instrument of severance did not thereby contemplate the use
of the water of the magnitude required by such operation;
and, additionally, as opposed to the "unfettered" implied
easement theory of the majority opinion, the dissent would
have simply applied the Getty test and have held such use
unreasonable as it interfered with the surface owner's preexisting use when reasonable alternatives, i.e., purchasing
water from sources other than the tract, was available.
See, 483 S.W.2d 813-823.

110.

483 S.W.2d at 810.

111.

470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971), cited at 483 S.W.2d at 812.

112.

483 S.W.2d at 811,

113.

Id.

114.

Id.

115.

351 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961, error ref'd).

116.

Id.

117.

See, Note, Right to Use Surface by Mineral Owner, 14 Baylor
L. Rev. 240 (1962).

118.

See, Ferguson, supra note 83 at 415.

119.

The theoretical basis for such an extensive implied dominant
easement is not definitively revealed in either Whittaker
or Texas Gulf Sulphur. One conceivable theory is that such
"dominance" of the mineral estate in Texas originates from
the lingering civil law heritage of the sovereign ownership
of all mines and minerals.
See, 483 S.W.2d at 816 and
Ferguson, supra note 83 at 414. Texas, as a republic and
later, briefly, as a state retained the sovereign ownership
of minerals derived from its Spanish colonial background.
Laws, Republic of Texas, 7th Congress, 3-4 (1840).
The
mineral rights, however, were fully relinquished to the
owners of the soil in 1866.
Tex. Const. Art. VII, § 20;
Art. XIII, § 2 (1845). Moreover, it seems hardly appropriate to determine the mineral owner's right to burden
the surface estate by a law intended to govern the extent
of the sovereign's right to extract state owned minerals from
private owned lands.
The dominance of the mineral estate may also be explained
-
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as a manifestation of the policy of encouraging the development and utilization of mineral resources.
That
necessarily assumes that such far greater benefits to
society are obtained from the extraction of minerals than
from other surface uses, such as agriculture, that the
mineral owner is entitled, without payment of compensation, to destroy the surface estate.
Not only is such an
assumption of dubious validity, it contravenes the traditional method of determining the extent of the burden
of mineral development to the surface estate on the basis
of ascertaining the existence of previously imparted
consent, i.e., determining the intent, or, due to the impracticality, the probability of the intent of the parties
to the instrument of severance.
Conceivably, however, the absolute dominance of the mineral
estate in Whittaker and Texas Gulf Sulphur, may be based on
the logic implicit in Trklja v. Keys: the parties to the
instrument of severance, more probable than not, contemplated that, if absolutely necessary to the beneficial
enjoyment of the mineral interest, the mineral owner
would be entitled to mine the minerals regardless of the
adverse affect on the surface estate. Although contrary
to the common law perspective, as evidenced by the recognized obligation of the mineral owner to provide subjacent support to the surface estate, and the majority view;
it may not be an unfounded assumption in areas characterized by mineral production in which the economic incidents of mining typically exceed the value of the contemporaneous surface usage.
120.

See, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §350.060(8) (1976); 50 Mont. Rev.
Codes Ann. §§1039.1, 1301, 1306 (Supp. 1975); 38 N.D. Cent.
Code 18 (Supp. 1975); 35 Wyo. Stat. 502-24(b)(x)- (xii)
(Supp. 1975).

121.

For an analysis of the Acts, see Beck, supra note 6 ; and
Karell, Montana's Statutory Protection of Surface Owners
from Strip Mining and Resultant Problems of Mineral Deed
Construction, 37 Mont. L. Rev. 347 (1976).

122.

Such acts differ from provisions common to surface mining
reclamation acts which merely require the mine operator
to demonstrate its right to surface mine, i.e., to reveal
its title to show, depending on the jurisdiction, an express or implied right to surface mine.
See, 30 U.S.C.A
§1257 (b)(9).

123.

In Dept. for Natural Resources & Environmental Protection
V. no. 8 Ltd. , 528 S.W.2d 684 (Ky, Ap . 1975) the Kentucky Act was held to
be unconstitutional on the basis that it changed the
relative legal rights of such private parties under their
contracts without achieving any public purpose.
For an
analysis of that case and the constitutionality of such
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statutes,

see Beck, supra note

6.

124.

Such legislation is analogous to state legislation in
Pennsylvania which required the coal lessee to leave sufficient coal in the underground mine to support the surface
estate despite the fact that the lessee had acquired a
waiver of subjacent support from the surface owner.
See,
The Kohler Act, 52 Pa. Stat. Ann. 666(13)(Purdons 1921),
which held to be an unconstitutional deprivation of property, without compensation; in violation of the 5th
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution the landmark case of
Pennsylvania Coal Co. V. M a hon, 260 U.S. 393.

125.

Chernicky v. Stewart, 439 Pa. 43, 46; 266 A.2d 259, 262
(1970).

126.

Id.

127.

Adkins, Legal Problems in Development and Utilization of
Southern Coal, 15 Annual Arkansas Nat. Resources Inst. 1
2 (1976); Broyles, Right to Mine Texas Uranium and Coal
by Surface Methods: Acker v. Guinn Revisited, 13 Houston
L. Rev. 451, 459 (1976).

128.

Broyles, supra note 121; DeLung, The Strohacker Doctrine
An Arkansas Rule of Property, 14th Annual Arkansas Nat.
Resources Inst. 1 (1975); Emery, What Surface is Mineral
and What Mineral is Surface?
12 Okl. L. Rev. 499 (1959);
Horner, Lignite - Surface or Mineral, 31 Ark. L. Rev. 75
(1971) ; Hortenstein, Is Coal Included in a Grant or Reservation of "Oil, Gas, or Other Minerals", 30 S.W.L.J.
481 (1976); Kuntz, Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming,
3 Wyo. L.J. 197 (1949); Maxwell, Meaning of "Minerals" The Relationship of Interpretation and Surface Burden,
8 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 255 (1974); Patterson, Survey of
Problems Associated with Ascertaining the Ownership of
"Other Minerals", 25 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Rev. 21-1 (1979).

129.

30 U.S.C.A. §1258(a)(8) provides that "each reclamation
plan submitted as part of a permit application ... shall
include ... a statement of:
"the consideration which has
been given to making the surface mining and reclamation
operations consistent with surface owner plans ..."

130.

Adkins, supra note 121 at 2; Stroud, supra note 22 at
591-2. Also, the mine operator may exchange land of
comparable value and utility for the landowner's tract.
See, Stroud, infra, 598.

131.

Stroud, Id. at 592.

132.

Id.
See, also, Burgess, Representing the Landowner in
a Mineral or Surface Lease or Sales Transaction, 22
Rocky Mt. Min. L. Rev. 451, 459, 60, 64, (1976).
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-33.

See,

120 Cong. Rec. 25230 (1974)

(Remarks of Rep. Ruppe).

134.

See generally, Adkins,
note
at 591-2.

135.

121 Cong. Rec. 6113 (1975)

136.

Id.

137.

Id.

138 .

30 U.S.C.A.

139.

Id. at §1258 (a)(10).

140.

Id. at §1258 (a)(2).

141.

Stroud, supra note 22 at 591.

142.

See, generally, Id. at 591; Burgess, Effects on the Private Landowner of Reclamation and Land Use Regulations
Governing Mineral Development of the Severed Mineral
Estate, paper presented before the Rocky Mtn. Min. L.
Inst., Denver, Colo. (1979) at 15-21-24.

143.

Id.

144.

For a discussion of economies of scale in surface mining,
see, Kalter and Tyner, supra note 25at 86, et seq.

145.

Prevention of physical waste of a valuable natural resource
and the protection of correlative rights is the basis of
typical state regulation of oil and gas.
See, 5 Kuntz,
Law of Oil and Gas, §70.1 (1978).

146.

Eminent domain, traditionally, may only be exercised by
the sovereign for the "public use." However, statutory
doncemnation schemes which require the acquired interest
to be utilized by private parties have been constitutionally sustained.
See, for example, a Mill Act case, Head
v. Amoskeag Mfg. C o ., 113 U.S. 9, 5 S. Ct. 441, 28 L .Ed.
441 (1885)7 discussed in Williams, supra note
at
Also, see, Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 79 S. Ct. 98,
99 L. Ed.2d 27 (1954) in which the Court sustained the
constitutional validity of the taking of the plaintiff's
property, which was not in a delapidated condition, to
be subsequently redeveloped, by private parties, on the
basis of the sovereign 's interest in eliminating slums
and creating aesthetically desirable neighborhoods.
See
generally Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain,
47 Wash. L. Rev. 553, 588-597 (1972); Comment, The Public
Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: A n advance R e q u i e m
58
Yale L. J. 599 (1949).

supra note 121 at 2; Stroud, supra
(remarks of Sen. Hansen).

§1260 (b)(3).
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Some state constitutions specifically define the public
use to include mining purposes.
See, Art. I, §14 Idaho
Const., Art III, §15 Mont. Const.
Conceivably, the restrictive interpretation of the public use requirement
contained in a state constitution or enabling statute
could render a state statute providing for condemnation
for mining purposes unconstitutional.
See, generally,
Campbell, Condemnation of Mining Properties, 14 Rocky
Mt. Min. L. Inst. 231 (1968).
147.

Hunter v. McHugh, 202 La. 97, 11 So.2d 495 (1942), appeal dis'md 320 U.S. 222, 64 S. Ct. 19, 88 L. Ed. 5
(1943); Patterson v. Standolind Oil & Gas Co., 182 Okla.
155, 77 P.2d 83 (1938) appeal dism’d 305 U.S. 376, 59 S.
Ct. 259, 85 L.E. 231 (1939).

148.

Armstrong v. High Crest Oils, Inc., 164 Mont. 187, 520
P.2d 1081 (1974); Palmer Oil Corn. v. Amerada Pet. Corp.,
204 Okl. 543, 231 P.2d 997 (1951), appeal dism’d 343,
U.S. 390, 72 S. Ct. 842, 96 L.Ed. 1022 (1952).

149.

6 Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law, §§906.2-3 (1977).

150.

See, generally, Williams, Unitization of Mining Properties, 17 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 245 (1972) which discusses, inter alia, the only found compulsory unitization
statute applicable to hard mineral, "Consolidation of
Small Tracts for Mineral Development", 69 N.M. Stat. Ann.
§9-1 et seq. (1967), which is applicable only to small
tracts of uranium.

151.

Basically, the mine unit contemplated by the statute is
analogous to the logical mining unit, which may be established, as provided by the Mineral Leasing Act Amendment
of 1975, 30 U.S.C.A. 202(A), upon approval by the
Secretary of the Interior, by consolidation of federal
coal leases, in excess of the statutory maximum of the
size of an area that may be leased, to achieve economic
and efficient recovery of coal reserves.
The amendment
provides as follows:
The Secretary, upon determining the maximum economic
recovery of the coal deposit or deposits is served
thereby, may approve the consolidation of coal
leases into a logical mining unit.
Such consolidation may only take place after a public hearing, if
requested by an person whose interest is or may be
adversely affected. A logical mining unit is an area
of land in which the coal resources can be developed
in an efficient, economical, and orderly manner as a
unit with due regard to conservation of coal reserves
and other resources. A logical mining unit may consist of one or more Federal leaseholds, and may include intervening or adjacent lands in which the
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United States does not own the coal resources, but
all the lands in a logical mining unit must be under
the effective control of a single operator, be able
to be developed and operated as a single operation
and be contiguous.
For a discussion of the logical mining unit and economies
of scale in coal surface minings, see, Kalter & Tyner,
supra note 25 at 36.
152. Additionally, the statute could also require the mine
operator to hold the respective necessary mining rights
equal in the aggregate to a stated percentage, computed
on an acreage basis, to the total interests contained in
the unit. The New Mexico Compulsory Unitization statute
infra, note 150 at §9 contained such a requirement.
However, due to the inevitable resistance to surface mining,
such a statutory requirement, especially if it equaled the
percentage of the consenting owners commonly required in
compulsory unitization schemes, ranging, from 62.5% in
Alaska to 857% in Mississippi, Williams 6c Meyers, supra
note 149 at §913.5, could render the statute inoperable.
153. To initiate the regulatory process, the petition of the
applicant would have to include, inter alia, a detailed
description of the following:
the boundaries of the
proposed unit; the unit mining and reclamation plans;
the projected mining and reclamation schedule for each
respective tract; the extent and characteristics of the
coal deposit underlying the proposed unit and each respective tract; and, the relevant ownership information
as to the committed and non-committed acreage. Also,
the facts necessary to determine the amount of compensation due to each affected property owner under the requisite formula would have to be specified.
154. Law of Aug. 1, 1958, The Opencast Coal Act, 22 Halsbury’s
Laws of England, §1, et seq., at 4720, (3d Ed. 1970).
155. For a legislative history discussing the primary legislative amendments offered as a solution to the regulation
of surface mining of federal coal on privately owned surface estates, see, Dunlap, supra note 27 at 28 to 31;
Gallinger & Haughey, Legislation Protection of the Surface Owner in the Surface Mining of Coal Reserved by the
United States, 22 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 145, 154-164
(1976); Comment, Surface Mining of the Severed Estate,
supra note 23 at 146-153.
156. Even if the instrument of severance grants the express
right to surface mine, Arkansas has held that the surface
owner is still entitled to be compensated for the destruction of the surface estate.
Benton v. U.S. Manganese
Corp., 229 Ark. 181, 313 S.W.2d 839 (1958). Kentucky
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courts have held to the contrary.
Martin v. Kentucky Oak
Mining C o ., 427 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968); Buchanan v. Watson,
290 STW.2d 40 (Ky. 1956).
See, for a discussion of the
cases, Norvell, The Coal and Lignite Lease Compared to the
Oil and Gas Lease, 31 Ark. L. Rev. 420, 446 (1977).
Therefore, in Arkansas, even if the right to surface mine
has been acquired in a prior grant or reservation, the
surface owner may still have to be compensated.
As Whittaker and Texas Gulf Sulphur indicate, if the right
to surface mine exists as an incident of the ownership
of the dominant mineral estate, by virtue of the implied
development easement, compensation of the surface owner
would not be required.
157.

See, 22 Halsbury's Laws,
§§17-36, at 494-515; and, also,
H.R. 25, quoted at 120 Cong. Rec. 7064.

158.

Advance royalties , from the date of the condemnation until
the actual mining of the tract, may also be utilized in the
compensation formula, especially if such royalties are
prevalent in the field.

159.

Prarie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1924);
Earp v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 167 Okl. 86, 27
P .2d 855 (1933); Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 147 S.W. 330,
108 Tex. 555, 195 S.W. 1139 (1917).

160.

Some forced pooling statutes, in fact, treat the affected mineral owner more generously than the common law
treatment accorded to the non-consenting cotenant, by
providing that the operator can only recoup his expenses
out of seven-eights of the proceeds due such mineral owner which ensures a one-eight royalty regardless of whether
the operator's costs are ever recovered.
See, 53 Ark.
Stat. §115 (1941); 52 Okla. Stat. Ann. §87-l(d)(1971).

161.

New Mexico's hard mineral compulsory statute provides for
compensating the mineral owner by a royalty interest, 69
N.M. Stat. Ann. 9-8(1967).
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